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Review Essay
Prior to 1989, the most important books and articles written about 
democratization asked whether democracy could take root in a largely 
authoritarian world. One set of volumes—Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule1—provided the most clinical analysis. But even earlier and more 
theoretical works, including Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy2 and Barrington 
Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,3 shared a focus 
on how to get from here to there.
In the twenty years since the Journal of Democracy was launched 
in 1990, democracy has gone from being a minority regime-type to 
being the most common type of regime the world over. No longer is 
democracy the odd duck or the struggling underdog. Today, it is the 
reigning champion among systems of government. The leading works 
on democracy that have appeared during this two-decade span have 
all been written within the context of democratic ascendancy. Without 
knowing anything about what they say, a prescient observer might 
guess that many of them have trafficked in worries about whether the 
good times can last.
“Worry” is perhaps an understatement. A rereading of the great works 
on democratization of the last twenty years reveals a pessimism that has 
been largely overlooked. Democracy’s vaunted status since 1989 has con-
tributed to a growing sense of insecurity, one grounded in an underlying 
suspicion that history moves in cycles or waves. Even the most allegedly 
triumphalist works of this period reveal authors who have tossed and 
turned over democracy’s fate. Most have argued that democracy rests on 
unstable foundations and that, if a few variables wobble ever so slightly, 
we will quickly find ourselves back in an authoritarian world. Indeed, 
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the hottest books on democratization these days concern not democratic 
advance but authoritarian resurgence.
If there was ever a triumphalist period, it was short-lived and muted. 
Samuel P. Huntington’s 1991 book The Third Wave4 gave the worldwide 
spate of democratizations that had begun in Portugal in 1974 a catchy 
label and provided the first broad-brush explanation of why they had 
happened. Earlier, Huntington had cast doubt on prospects for global 
democratic advance5 and coauthored a deeply pessimistic book on West-
ern democracies.6 Now he stressed the inability of authoritarian regimes, 
even “orderly” ones, to legitimate their rule in the face of increasingly 
educated, self-respecting, and therefore assertive citizens.
Still, Huntington’s earlier pessimism about democracy remained. 
Indeed, the final third of the book is devoted to threats to the new de-
mocracies and to the “reverse wave” that these threats portended. Restive 
militaries, authoritarian nostalgia, democratic disenchantment, unresolved 
human-rights cases, and authoritarian political cultures all stalked the new 
regimes. The external drivers of democratization—the liberated Catholic 
Church and the Soviet collapse—were exhausted, and no other factor 
seemed likely to play the same role. Indeed, early signs of backsliding 
in Russia were already giving comfort to entrenched leaders in the for-
mer Soviet Union. Elected leaders would clamp down on civil liberties 
and emerge as new authoritarians. Presaging his coming concerns with 
culture, Huntington also doubted whether countries without “substantial 
Western influence” could sustain a form of government that had Western 
origins. Liberalization in the Arab world, for instance, was empowering 
not democrats but Islamist radicals.
If Huntington’s lingering democratic pessimism has been overlooked, 
the worrisome tones in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and 
the Last Man7 have been virtually erased from memory. In the wake of 
communism’s collapse, the world needed a democratic triumphalist to 
ridicule. Fukuyama’s ponderous philosophical-comparative work fit the 
role admirably, especially for those who did not read it. The term “end of 
history,” originally used by Hegel, became synonymous with excessive 
democratic optimism. What critics forgot was the second part of the title: 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s pathetic “last man,” a creature stripped of all vitality 
by the material comforts and formal equality that democracy provides. 
The least serious threats to democracy, Fukuyama believed, would 
come from economic and governance failures. Some authoritarian re-
gimes would persist in poor countries because of their failure to join what 
he called the “wagon train” of modernization. In other places, gaping 
material inequalities would give rise to antidemocratic movements. But 
those problems could usually be solved with straightforward policies and 
institutions—the familiar “good-governance” agenda. 
Democracy’s ultimate fate, Fukuyama believed, would not hinge on the 
size of Gini coefficients. What really worried him, and took up the final 
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fifth of his book, was the sociopsychological threat: the desire that some 
humans will always have to dominate others. For even when democracy 
has solved all the problems of development, a democratic society can 
provide the human urge to dominate only with very limited outlets—in 
the worlds of sports, business, or spirited electoral politics. 
This means that democracy will always be vulnerable to antidemocratic 
movements such as postcommunist nationalism in China and Russia or 
Islamist totalitarianisms in the Arab world. These are the wagons that are 
not content to stay with the rest of the train, but which, “having looked 
around a bit at their new surroundings . . . find them inadequate and set 
their eyes on a new and more distant journey.” In the end, Fukuyama 
deemed world-historical evidence to be “provisionally inconclusive”8 as 
to whether democracy indeed constitutes the final form of government, a 
phase of political development beyond which humanity can go no further. 
It was hardly a triumphalist conclusion.
Shortly thereafter, Robert D. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work,9 a 
comparative study of the performance of Italy’s twenty regional govern-
ments, was published to great acclaim. The book is subject-catalogued 
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under “Italian politics,” but its findings have been studied by every country 
specialist worth his or her salt. Putnam defined performance mainly in terms 
of bureaucratic effectiveness, but as he and his collaborators showed, satis-
faction with democracy itself was closely linked to this sort of performance, 
hence the title. In effect, the message was that only those places with long, 
historically grounded traditions of civic involvement and social solidarity 
stand a chance of generating effective bureaucracy, and thus successful 
democracy. Putnam found that most of the twenty regional governments, 
especially those in southern Italy, lacked such social supports and therefore 
performed badly. Social conflict, exploitation, criminality, poverty, corrup-
tion, clientelism, lawlessness, and degraded public services would be their 
fate. The book could easily have been titled Making Democracy Fail.
Even if most readers failed to grasp or forgot about the pessimistic im-
plications, Putnam did not. “The fate of the Mezzogiorno [southern Italy] 
is an object lesson for the Third World today and the former Communist 
lands of Eurasia tomorrow, moving uncertainly towards self-government,” 
he wrote. “The ‘always defect’ [noncooperative] social equilibrium may 
represent the future of much of the world where social capital is limited 
or nonexistent. . . . This is a depressing observation for those who view 
institutional reform as a strategy for political change.” One Italian leader, 
he noted, called his book “a counsel of despair.”10 More shocking still was 
Putnam’s announcement in his January 1995 Journal of Democracy article 
“Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” the most-accessed 
article in this journal’s history, that a similar fate or worse awaited the 
United States if the trends since 1970 continued: “Two generations’ decline 
at the same rate would leave the United States at the level of today’s Chile, 
Portugal, and Slovenia.”11 
Not long after, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan published their influential 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,12 a book whose title 
alone reflected the uncertainties that troubled its authors as they surveyed 
the state of the democratic project around the globe. Eighteen years earlier, 
in 1978, the pair had coedited and contributed to an influential series titled 
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes,13 which was an exercise in pre-
emptive pessimism undertaken as the democratic age dawned. Returning 
to those themes here, they emphasized not social but political inheritances 
and how these affected democracy’s chances of taking root and succeeding. 
Although theirs was not exactly a counsel of despair, it was a prognosis 
whose hue was far from rosy: “It is probable that in some of the countries 
we have analyzed, democracy will never be consolidated . . . In this context, 
democratic triumphalism is not only uncalled for but dangerous.”14 
By the late 1990s, authors whose fears closely tracked those of Hun-
tington, Fukuyama, Putnam, and Linz and Stepan were appearing in print 
seemingly everywhere. The former Yugoslavia had descended into internal 
warfare early in the decade, and had been rescued only by a U.S.-led alli-
ance (working ultimately through NATO and not the UN) that was forced 
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to act in the face of bitter opposition from a supposedly democratic Russia. 
Elected autocrats such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Belarus’s Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka were cropping up all over. In the Philippines, democracy had 
descended into farce under the presidency of the populist movie star Joseph 
Estrada. Even in India, democracy seemed suddenly mortal as the Hindu-
sectarian Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 1998.
In the United States, there appeared a string of influential articles meant 
to persuade policy makers to lay aside any democratic optimism once 
and for all. These works included Fareed Zakaria’s “The Rise of Illiberal 
Democracy,”15 Robert Kaplan’s “Was Democracy Just a Moment?”16 
and Thomas Carothers’s “The End of the Transition Paradigm.”17 They 
shared some common themes: Democracy’s advance had been a broad 
but shallow phenomenon; democratic culture had in most places failed to 
put down deep roots, perhaps because it lacked just the sorts of founda-
tions that scholars had long been saying it would need; the world was not 
inexorably moving toward liberal democracy. As the influential journal-
ist and commentator Zakaria put it: “Far from [what we see before us] 
being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries 
are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of 
democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism.”18 
The seemingly Panglossian belief that all countries were transitioning 
toward democracy was the target of Carothers’s skeptical contribution—
which has become the second-most frequently accessed article in the 
online history of the Journal of Democracy. He suggested that the whole 
democratization paradigm was hopelessly teleological—a giant exercise in 
wishful thinking—that should be replaced by something else (what, exactly, 
he never said). The academic and policy communities swiftly and eagerly 
embraced Carothers’s critique. Kaplan, a saturnine essayist at the best of 
times, had earlier gone so far as to warn that the authoritarian resurgence 
would not be confined to non-Western countries: “Marxism’s natural death 
in Eastern Europe is no guarantee that subtler tyrannies do not await us, 
here and abroad.” Any effort to overthrow the Saddam Hussein dictatorship 
in Iraq, he presciently warned, would leave “a mess.”19
By the mid-2000s, attention had decisively shifted away from bestow-
ing laurels on the democratizers to explaining the new authoritarians. 
Andrew J. Nathan’s “Authoritarian Resilience”20 became the touchstone 
for a revived interest in the Chinese Communist Party’s post-Tiananmen 
vigor. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s “The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism,”21 the fourth-most accessed Journal of Democracy 
article, also set the new tone. (The third-most accessed is Larry Dia-
mond’s related “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes” from the same issue, 
a taxonomy of the imperfect democracies stalking the globe.) Taking up 
the challenge posed by Carothers, Levitsky and Way sought to develop 
an account of regime trajectories that did not rest on the tacit assump-
tion that democracy must somehow always be the destination at the end 
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of the line. “Research on nondemocratic outcomes is critical to gaining 
a better understanding of the full (rather than hoped for) set of alterna-
tives open to post–Cold War transitional regimes,” they wrote.22 Their 
particular contribution was the notion of a “competitive authoritarian” 
regime, where political competition through elections, legislatures, the 
legal system, and the media is “real but unfair.”
Yet something began to change here, imperceptibly at first but then 
more visibly. Having spent the better part of two decades hammering 
away at the alloyed new democracies, scholars and policy makers who 
sought to forge gleaming new theories out of the world’s residual au-
thoritarian regimes found little that was pure and simple. The reasons for 
authoritarian optimism seemed shakier once you began to study actually 
existing authoritarianism. In a forthcoming book23 based on their original 
essay, for instance, Levitsky and Way identify 34 “competitive authori-
tarian” regimes that were founded between 1990 and 1995, and find that 
15 have since democratized (Croatia, Mexico, and Taiwan are among 
their number); another ten, thanks to the rise of effective oppositions, 
have progressed enough to become borderline democracies. Only nine 
competitive authoritarian regimes (or 26 percent) have remained clearly 
in this category, and at least two of these, Malaysia and Zimbabwe, no 
longer seem stable (which would bring the truly durable proportion down 
to 21 percent). The full set of alternatives, then, turns out to be not much 
different from the hoped-for set.
In other words, democratization is starting to look like a pretty good 
teleology again. Attempts to build alternative paradigms of authoritarian 
regime trajectories have delivered limited results. Stable authoritarianism 
like that found in China is nearly miraculous in our democratic age. 
So is it time to renew optimism about the democratic project? Throughout 
the 2000s, important democratic gains have been seen not only in Croatia 
and Mexico, but also in Burundi, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, and Turkey. Sta-
tistically, there is evidence of a small overall gain for democracy worldwide 
in the last decade: In 2000, the global average score for “political rights” 
and “civil liberties” reported by Freedom House was 3.5 (on a scale of 1 to 
7, where 1 means “most free”); in 2008, that score had improved slightly, 
to 3.3 on the Freedom House scale. Japan, which Fukuyama ventured in 
his book “would feel profoundly uncomfortable with more ‘open’ contesta-
tion or the alternation of parties in power,”24 delivered a first-ever majority 
mandate to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan in 2009. The same 
year, India continued its unbroken record of foiling democratic-doomsayers 
by holding yet another successfully run free election, turning back the BJP, 
and keeping the Congress party in power. With an estimated 714 million 
voters taking part, it was the biggest free and peaceful exercise of self-
government by balloting in all of human history.
Ironically, Carothers himself has recently warned about excessive 
“democratic pessimism.”25 Perhaps, as he suggests, democracy has become 
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a victim of its own success. It has set higher expectations for how rulers 
should rule and thus, with the shortfalls amplified by information technol-
ogy, has made it less likely that any regime will succeed. The battle for 
democracy is nothing new in our world. But it is being waged in more 
places and in a jungle of higher expectations. Meanwhile, according to 
public-opinion surveys, there has been no change in the virtually universal 
popular preference for democracy as the ideal form of government. 
Fukuyama’s opening chapter bore the title “Our Pessimism.” There 
had been a loss of faith in progress he lamented, even as “the world as a 
whole . . . has gotten better in certain distinct ways.” The world needed to 
revise “the pessimistic lessons about history that our century supposedly 
taught us.”26 The post-1989 era also has taught us to be pessimistic about 
democracy, even as global democracy has advanced in certain distinct 
ways. Perhaps the positive electoral events in India and Japan will be seen 
as a turning point. Looking beyond the reverse wave that he expected 
would come, Huntington argued that a fourth wave of democratic advance 
would follow. Good times follow bad times, even when the bad times 
turn out to have been not so bad. Iran? Iraq? Malaysia? Zimbabwe? Even 
China, with its one-fifth of all the people on the planet? The world is set 
for a continued advance of democracy, an advance that we may one day 
be willing to call a triumph.
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